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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TRANSAMERICAN TITLE INSURANCE COMPANY, FORMERLY PHOENIX TITLE AND
TRUST COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent.,

Case No.
11921

vs.

UNITED RESOURCES, INC.,
)
FORMERLY UNITED TELETRONICS, INC.
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

FURTHER STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and Defendant entered into a contract
in Arizona whereby the Plaintiff agreed to sell certain
real property located within Arizona to the Defendant. The Defendant expressly undertook the obliga1

tion to pay certain installments upon said contract to
the Plaintiff in Arizona. The Defendant failed to perform and, due to the monetary harm resulting to Plaintiff, Plaintiff sued for breach of contract in the Su.
perior Court of Maricopa County, State of Arizona.
At the time of commencement of the Arizona suit,
Defendant was a corporation incorporated under the
Laws of Utah, but had failed to have had appointed an
agent for service of process in Arizona.
Pursuant to Rule 4 ( e) , Arizona Rules of Civil
Procedure, Defendant was served personally outside
Arizona and within Utah by service upon the agent·
designated as being authorized to receive service with·
in Utah.
Defendant did not answer said Complaint nor at
that time did not specially appear to contest whether
Arizona had jurisdiction. Upon the failure of Defend·
ants to answer or appear, a judgment by default was
entered awarding Plaintiff the amount prayed for in
its Complaint.
A second suit was instituted in Utah based upon
the Arizona judgment. At that time Defendants an·
swered claiming, inter alia, that the Arizona Court had
no jurisdiction. It should be noted that no appeal cha!·
lenging jurisdiction was ever taken to the Arizona Su·
preme Court.
Plaintiff moved, in Utah, for Summary Judgment
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relying upon the Full Faith and Credit clause of the
United States Constitution.
Upon the submission of briefs at the request of the
Court upon the issue of whether or not Arizona had
jurisdiction in the original suit, a judgment against Defendant in favor of Plaintiff was awarded exactly as
that a warded by the Arizona Court by the Honorable
Stewart M. Hanson, Judge of the Third District Court,
in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on the 4th
day of November, 1969.
This appeal resulted.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
TO DENY FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
TO THE ARIZONA JUDGMENT NOT ONLY
CIRCUMVENTS THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION, BUT UNDERMINES THE
SETTLED CONCEPT OF RES JUDICATA.
It is well established that allegations continued in
a Plaintiff's Complaint are taken as admitted unless
specifically denied by the Defendant. See URCP 8 ( d).
The Defendants had but to file an answer denying jurisdiction of the Arizona Court in the original suit in
order to have put it into issue. This step they failed to
do. Furthermore, relief could have been, but was not
sought in the Arizona Supreme Court, but Defendants
also failed to pursue this avenue of relief.
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Now, after Plaintiff's attempt to satisfy the judg.
ment in the only alternative remaining to them due to
the fact of no assets being owned by Defendants in Ari·
zona, Defendant now chooses to challenge the jurisdiction of the Arizona Court.

What, then, should this Court consider on this ap·
peal. First, reference should be made to a concept embodied in the decision of DURFEE v. DUKE, 375
U.S. 106 ( 1963) by the United States Supreme Court.
In Durfee, the Court reviewed and reaffirmed what it
termed the "Rule of jurisdiction finality" in holding that
a federal court in Missouri must give full faith and
credit to a decree of a Nebraska State Court quieting ·
title to land, EVEN THOUGH CONVINCED
THAT THE LAND WAS SITUATED IN MIS·
SOUR! AND THAT THEREFORE THE NEBRASKA COURT WAS 'VITHOUT JURIS·
DICTION.
It should be noted that reference to the above decision is not relied upon because Plaintiff feels 'the Ari·
zona Court was without jurisdiction. Rather, Arizona,
by virtue of its own law together with Defendant's fail·
ure to challenge jurisdiction in Arizona resulted in the
Arizona Court deciding the matter of its jurisdiction in
the matter, and, once concluding it had, means that is·
sue is once and for all Res J udicata.

The fact that the Arizona judgment was by default
presents no problem. The cases of United States v.
United Mine Workers of America 330 U.S. 258 (1947)
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and Carter v. United States 135 F.2d 858 (5th CIR,
1943) denied collateral attacks upon jurisdiction even
though the lower courts' decisions were results of exparte hearings.
Thus, it is the inevitable conclusion that the policy
against a Court possibly acting beyond its jurisdiction
can seldom outweigh society's interest in preserving judicial law and order. As Mr. Justice Frankfurt!er said
in the United Mine Workers case, a judicial determination is not to be "treated as though it were a letter to a
newspaper".
ARGUMENT
POINT II
THE ARIZONA LONG-ARM STATUTE TOGETHER WI TH DECISIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
ESTABLISH THAT THE ARIZONA COURT
DID IN FACT HAVE JURISDICTION OVER
THE DEFENDANT.
Rule 4 ( e) ( 2) of the Arizona Rules of Civil Procedure allows Arizona Cour'ts to acquire in personam
jurisdiction over a non-resident Defendant who "has
caused an event to occur in this state out of which the
claim arose." More liberal bases of inpersom jurisdiction over foreign corporations have been promulgated
by United States Supreme Court decisions such as
International Shoe Company v. Stat,e of Washington
326 U.S. 310 (1945) wherein the "minimum contacts"
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test with the forum state was conceived. The trend to·
ward a more liberalization of the "minimum contact''
test is found in the case of McGee v. International Life
Insurance Co. 355 U.S. 220 (1957) did not require a
showing of actually doing business within the forum
state in order to subject the company-defendant to the
forum's jurisdiction. In McGee, the Defendant company merely solicited insurance contracts through the
mail, and yet was held to be subject to the si1>ter-state's
jurisdiction. Thus, the "substantial connection" with
the state arose and is clearly applicable in the case now
before the bar. For example, the contract was entered
into in Arizona; the subject matter of the contract was
located in Arizona; the performance of the contract was
to be in Arizona; and the breach of the contract by this
Defendant created damage to the Arizona Plaintiffresident. Clearly, both the "minimum contacts" and
"substantial connection" tests are more than applicable
and the conclusion is inescapable that the Arizona ·
Court, one of general jurisdiction, had jurisdiction over
this Defendant in the original lawsuit.
ARGUMENT
POINT III
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS AND IS
THE PROPER A VENUE OF RELIEF IN
THIS CASE.
In Point II of the Appellant's brief, argument ii
made that an issue of fact remained and therefore suIJ1·
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mary judgment was inappropriate. The appellant, in
support of its argument, points to the fact that Plaintiff, in its request for interrogatories, asked the question
of the basis of the denial of the Arizona Cour't's jurisdiction.
Jurisdiction, however, is not a question of fact, but
clearly one of law as indicated by Defendant in its Objections to Interrogatories. (Record p. 12). The question of jurisdiction as indicated earlier, was settled in
the original law suit by virtue of defendant's defa ult to
challenge the same.
Defendant also emphasized the fact that the objections were never ruled upon as being highly irregular when in fact at the hearing on the objections, defense
counsel was not present nor did anybody appear on defendant's behalf.

CONCLUSION
This appeal by the defendant, if successful, raises
serious implications of constitutional proportions. What
of the policy underlying Res J udicata which was established for situations iden'tical with the one presently at
hand which, if applied, prevents unnecessary litigation
over matters previously determined by a court of law.
Without strict application of this principle, all Defendants could create multitudes of law suits by merely
physically moving from State to State.
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What of the policy embodied in full faith and
credit. Was it not set up for the very purpose that defendant is presently attempting to frustrate. If defendant's appeal is successful does it not encourage other
defendant's to allow suits to go to default and later
claim denial of due process because their rights had not
been adjudicated? Does not defendant's argument encourage other future defendants to avoid their liability
producing acts by failing to appear when properly
notified.
What of default judgments themselves. Without
them, litigation could and would be drawn out for years
ad infinitum and, realizing the possibility of such an
occurrence, all the legislatures of all the states provided
for default judgments in order to preserve the vitality i
and continued respect for the FIN ALITY of judicial
determinations. Therefore, for the above stated reasons '.
founded in sound judicial precedent and public policy, i
the defendant's appeal must fail.
!
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Respectfully submitted,
KENT T. YANO
Attorney for Respondent
840 Kennecott Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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